melech-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests historical transcript data from multiple AI agents, which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if those transcripts contain adversarial content.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/handoff.pyscript reads JSON and JSONL files from provider-specific directories (e.g., Cursor, Claude Code, Codex) as specified inreferences/providers.jsonto extract previous conversation turns. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or "ignore" directives to the agent when it is instructed to read the retrieved transcript content.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes Git commands via
subprocess.runand has the capability to read any file within the detected transcript directories. - Sanitization: The Python script performs minimal cleaning of specific tags like
<user_query>and<timestamp>using regular expressions in theclean_user_textfunction, but it does not implement comprehensive sanitization against general LLM prompt injection patterns. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to execute Git commands for repository and worktree discovery. - Evidence:
scripts/handoff.pycontains calls togit rev-parse --show-toplevelandgit worktree list --porcelain. These operations use static argument lists and do not incorporate unsanitized user-provided input into the command string.
Audit Metadata