github-auth
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs sensitive file access to retrieve authentication tokens. It contains logic to read from
~/.git-credentialsand$HOME/.hermes/.envto identify and extract existing GitHub Personal Access Tokens. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions recommend storing credentials in plaintext on the filesystem. Method 1 suggests using
git config --global credential.helper store, which saves authentication tokens without encryption in the~/.git-credentialsfile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell command substitution and pipe chains to programmatically extract secrets. It employs
grepandsedto parse sensitive configuration files and export discovered tokens to theGITHUB_TOKENenvironment variable at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through repository metadata.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/gh-env.shingests repository remote URLs directly from the output of thegit remotecommand. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions that might be embedded in a malicious repository URL or name.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for network operations via
curlandgh, and system configuration viagitandssh-keygen. - Sanitization: Input from the git configuration is processed using basic regex in
sedandcutwithout verifying the integrity of the data source or the contents of the parsed strings.
Audit Metadata