github-pr-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains logic to extract authentication tokens from sensitive local paths, specifically
~/.git-credentialsand~/.hermes/.env. Accessing these files directly to harvest secrets is a high-risk activity that exposes user credentials, even when the data is used for intended interactions with official APIs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through its automated CI log processing. 1. Ingestion points: CI log content fetched from GitHub API (api.github.com). 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the skill instructions direct the agent to 'read failure logs -> understand the error' without defining safety boundaries for the untrusted text. 3. Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file modification capabilities (
patch,write_file) and repository management (git commit,git push). 4. Sanitization: Absent; external log data is processed without escaping or validation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches ZIP archives and log files from GitHub's official API. This is documented and associated with the primary purpose of the skill, targeting a well-known service.
Audit Metadata