appbuilder-workfront

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches official developer tools and templates from Adobe's registries, including @adobe/aio-cli, @adobe/workfront-ui-ext-tpl, and @adobe/uix-guest.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides a detailed reference for the aio CLI to manage the application lifecycle, including authentication, project initialization, local development server execution, and cloud deployment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Includes instructions for modifying local development environment settings, such as trusting self-signed certificates and disabling the Chrome local-network-access-check flag to allow communication between the browser and a local development server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill outlines a data flow for processing external information from Workfront, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system context via sharedContext in the front-end SPA and the params object in serverless Runtime actions (workfront-actions/assets/action-boilerplate.js).
  • Boundary markers: The provided code templates do not implement specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for data ingested from the Workfront environment.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities for network requests via fetch to the Workfront Public API and Planning APIs, as well as file-based configuration management.
  • Sanitization: Basic validation is included to ensure parameters like the IMS organization ID are present and properly formatted before being used in API headers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 5, 2026, 01:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — appbuilder-workfront