create-component
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes data from external Figma designs to generate component code.
- Ingestion points: Design context is retrieved from user-supplied Figma URLs using the
get_design_contexttool via theplugin-figma-figmaMCP server, as described inreferences/figma-design-rules.md. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdworkflow includes a mandatory confirmation step (Step 2) where the agent must echo back the understood dialog specification for user approval before any files are created. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing multiple file types (XML, HTL, Java, CSS, and JS) to the project's local directory structure as defined in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: The instructions in
references/figma-design-rules.mdtreat Figma output strictly as a reference, requiring the agent to translate JSX structures into semantic AEM HTL rather than directly executing or copying external code. - [SAFE]: The skill implements a robust 'Configuration Gate Check' that prevents the agent from operating until a local
.aem-skills-config.yamlfile is verified, ensuring that file operations occur within the intended project scope and paths. - [SAFE]: The reference documentation included with the skill (e.g.,
references/htl-patterns.mdandreferences/sling-servlet-standards.md) enforces security best practices for all generated code, specifically mandating XSS expression contexts and CSRF token handling.
Audit Metadata