dispatcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its log analysis and configuration authoring capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests untrusted data from Dispatcher logs via the
tail_logstool and request details viatrace_request(documented inincident-response/SKILL.mdandconfig-authoring/SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define clear delimiters or markers to separate untrusted tool output from the agent's internal reasoning, nor do they include warnings to ignore instructions found within external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to create and modify critical system configuration files, such as
.any,.vhost, and.rulesfiles (documented inconfig-authoring/SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There are no explicit instructions for the agent to filter, escape, or sanitize content retrieved from logs before processing it.
Audit Metadata