uplift
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from a user-provided URL in Phase 1 (Extract). The content is extracted using Playwright and then used to drive design decisions and variant generation.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 delegates to
stardust:extractwhich crawls a remote URL and saves the content to local JSON files (pages/home.json,_brand-extraction.json). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the scraped website content before it is processed by the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file writing (
uplift-improvements.md,uplift-questions.md,direction.md), file reading, and delegates to other skills that execute shell commands and render HTML prototypes. - Sanitization: There is no explicit mention of sanitizing or filtering the content extracted from the external URL before it influences the agent's logic in subsequent phases.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands for workflow management and output display.
- Phase 5 (Prototype) describes using
git worktreeor directory copies to create isolated workspaces for parallel rendering of design variants. - Phase 6 (Open) explicitly requires using the
opencommand to view the generated prototype files in a browser via the preview service worker. - Phase 5 also mentions the use of
$impeccable craftfor rendering.
Audit Metadata