lingui-next-init
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because the
scripts/scaffold_lingui_next.pyscript interpolates user-provided arguments (such as locales and package names) directly into generated source code and configuration files without sufficient escaping.\n - Ingestion points: Command-line parameters like
--locales,--i18n-package-name, and--server-layouts-packageinscripts/scaffold_lingui_next.py.\n - Boundary markers: None. Interpolated values are placed directly into template strings in files like
data.ts.tplandweb/package.scripts.json.tpl.\n - Capability inventory: The skill writes and modifies files in the target project, including
.ts,.tsx,.json, and.gitignorefiles usingPath.write_textandjson.dumps.\n - Sanitization: The script validates that the package manager is one of a few known strings (pnpm, npm, yarn, bun) but does not sanitize or escape other inputs for characters that could break code syntax or JSON structures.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates scripts for the target project (e.g.,
web/scripts/build.tsandweb/scripts/i18n/index.ts) that utilizeexecSyncandspawnSyncto run package manager commands and Lingui CLI tools. These are standard for the intended workflow but represent executable surface area generated from templates.
Audit Metadata