lingui-next-init

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because the scripts/scaffold_lingui_next.py script interpolates user-provided arguments (such as locales and package names) directly into generated source code and configuration files without sufficient escaping.\n
  • Ingestion points: Command-line parameters like --locales, --i18n-package-name, and --server-layouts-package in scripts/scaffold_lingui_next.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: None. Interpolated values are placed directly into template strings in files like data.ts.tpl and web/package.scripts.json.tpl.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill writes and modifies files in the target project, including .ts, .tsx, .json, and .gitignore files using Path.write_text and json.dumps.\n
  • Sanitization: The script validates that the package manager is one of a few known strings (pnpm, npm, yarn, bun) but does not sanitize or escape other inputs for characters that could break code syntax or JSON structures.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates scripts for the target project (e.g., web/scripts/build.ts and web/scripts/i18n/index.ts) that utilize execSync and spawnSync to run package manager commands and Lingui CLI tools. These are standard for the intended workflow but represent executable surface area generated from templates.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 01:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lingui-next-init