open-code-review-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from the local Git repository for AI-assisted review. This presents a surface for indirect prompt injection if a reviewed file contains instructions intended to manipulate the AI Reviewer. The skill actively mitigates this risk through multiple layers of defense: it uses strictly defined JSON output schemas, configures external AI CLIs with non-interactive read-only sandboxing (e.g., safe-mode for Claude Code, read-only sandboxes for Codex and Grok), and performs independent host-side verification of all changes, rejecting out-of-scope writes. This surface is fundamental to the skill's purpose and is managed securely.
- Ingestion points: Repository files are read by
scripts/build_review_bundle.pyand encapsulated in a JSON bundle for the Reviewer. - Boundary markers: Explicit JSON schemas (
review-schema.json,fix-schema.json) and product-specific read-only flags (e.g.,--sandbox read-only,--safe-mode) are used to constrain model behavior. - Capability inventory: Subprocess calls are restricted to
git,ocr, and specific AI products, managed via list-based arguments. - Sanitization: The host agent validates all structured output and re-verifies repository state using Git to verify mutations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates external tool invocations (
git,ocr, AI CLIs) usingsubprocess.runwith list-based arguments in its Python scripts, which effectively prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. Additionally,scripts/build_review_bundle.pyimplements path validation to ensure repository-relative access and prevent path traversal attacks.
Audit Metadata