task-completion-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository, such as project plans, specifications, and existing source code, which are used to drive the reasoning and implementation loop across multiple AI agents (Host, Grok, and Claude).
- Ingestion points: Phase 0 reads repository instructions, plans, specs, and the current working tree code.
- Boundary markers: The skill relies on defined 'frozen scopes' and 'authorization boundaries' to limit agent actions, but it does not specify explicit prompt delimiters or sanitization protocols for the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing to the file system to implement code changes, calling external tools (goal-gate, agentic-review-handoff, architecture-hardening-loop, grill-with-docs), and executing verification tests which involve subprocess execution.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the external content before it is processed by the agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system modifications and executes verification commands (CLI, browser, or runtime signals) to validate implementations during Phase 3.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on external agents (Grok Build and Claude Code) to provide independent standpoints and audits. While it attempts to enforce a read-only boundary for the final Claude audit, the orchestration inherently depends on the dynamic output and execution capabilities of these external entities.
Audit Metadata