cc-pr-review-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes Pull Request diffs, titles, and bodies which are untrusted external inputs. These inputs are analyzed by an agent with shell access and API capabilities. There are no explicit boundary markers or directives provided to separate PR content from review instructions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
gh pr view,gh pr diff, andgit diffcommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent in the domain reference files.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
gh,git,find) and Node.jsexecSyncinpost-review.js. - Sanitization: Not specified in the instructions for processing PR data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and the associated
post-review.jsscript construct shell commands using string interpolation of variables derived from the PR or environment. Specifically, thedevops.mdguideline suggests usingfind . -name "<filename>"where<filename>is an untrusted name from the PR, which could lead to command injection if malicious filenames are present. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to dynamically load and read instructions from other skills (e.g.,
test-validity-reviewandtesting-best-practice) based on local file paths. This introduces a dependency on the integrity of the local environment's skill configuration.
Audit Metadata