cc-pr-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the lead agent to spawn all sub-agents using
mode: "bypassPermissions". This is a direct attempt to circumvent the platform's security model, which typically requires user authorization for sensitive actions like reading files or executing commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions require the agent to scan and read the
SKILL.mdfiles for all skills installed in both the user's home directory ($HOME/.claude/skills/) and the local project directory. This behavior exposes the logic and potential secrets of other agents installed on the system to the current skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted data from GitHub pull requests and pass it to multiple sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Output from
gh pr viewandgh pr diffinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The PR data is stored in
/tmp/pr-review-data.mdand then read by sub-agents without any sanitization or clear delimiters to separate untrusted content from instructions. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents have access to the shell (via
bash,gh,git) and the filesystem. - Sanitization: No filtering or escaping is applied to the PR metadata or diff content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various shell commands (
gh,git,bash,find) to gather data and verify file duplication. When combined with the permission bypass and untrusted input from PRs, this increases the risk of arbitrary command execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata