punk-cover
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs file paths to load style-specific configuration and assets. It is instructed to read metadata and style definitions from paths like
../../styles/{style-id}/META.mdand../../styles/{style-id}/STYLE.md. Using computed paths based on variable identifiers (style-id) derived from user or agent selection can lead to unauthorized file access or directory traversal if not strictly validated against a known-good catalog. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user content (such as articles or topic descriptions) and interpolates this data directly into a complex image generation prompt template.
- Ingestion points: Source material, titles, and topics provided by the user in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The final prompt blueprint in
references/cover-prompt-blueprint.mddoes not utilize delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) to isolate user-supplied fields such as{title_or_topic},{summary}, and{visual_subject}from the agent's core instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill leverages an image generation tool and has permission to write files to the local
punk-assets/directory. - Sanitization: While the skill summarizes long articles, it lacks explicit sanitization or escaping mechanisms for user-provided strings before they are injected into the final prompt context.
Audit Metadata