pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyperforms runtime compilation of a C shim usinggcc. The resulting shared library is then loaded into the LibreOffice process viaLD_PRELOADto wrap socket function calls. This represents a high-privilege capability involving both code generation and injection techniques. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components execute system utilities via
subprocess.run. This includes runninggccfor shim compilation,gitfor document difference analysis inscripts/office/validators/redlining.py, andsofficeandpdftoppmfor slide image conversion inscripts/thumbnail.py. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external presentation data.
- Ingestion points: Content is extracted from user-provided
.pptxfiles usingmarkitdownand visualized through image thumbnails generated bythumbnail.py. - Boundary markers: Analysis of
SKILL.mdand associated documentation reveals an absence of delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially adversarial commands embedded in extracted content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive local capabilities, including file system modification and execution of multiple system binaries, which could be leveraged if an agent obeys instructions hidden within a processed presentation.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization performed on the extracted slide data before it is presented to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata