pptx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py performs runtime compilation of a C shim using gcc. The resulting shared library is then loaded into the LibreOffice process via LD_PRELOAD to wrap socket function calls. This represents a high-privilege capability involving both code generation and injection techniques.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components execute system utilities via subprocess.run. This includes running gcc for shim compilation, git for document difference analysis in scripts/office/validators/redlining.py, and soffice and pdftoppm for slide image conversion in scripts/thumbnail.py.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external presentation data.
  • Ingestion points: Content is extracted from user-provided .pptx files using markitdown and visualized through image thumbnails generated by thumbnail.py.
  • Boundary markers: Analysis of SKILL.md and associated documentation reveals an absence of delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially adversarial commands embedded in extracted content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive local capabilities, including file system modification and execution of multiple system binaries, which could be leveraged if an agent obeys instructions hidden within a processed presentation.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization performed on the extracted slide data before it is presented to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 12, 2026, 05:22 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pptx