xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py performs runtime compilation of a C shim. It writes source code to a temporary directory, invokes gcc to create a shared object, and then uses the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject this library into the soffice process. This mechanism is used to enable LibreOffice functionality in environments where AF_UNIX sockets are restricted.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts invoke system commands via subprocess.run(). Specifically, scripts/recalc.py and scripts/office/soffice.py execute the soffice binary for Excel operations, and scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executes the git command to generate text diffs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied spreadsheet files, which creates an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: pd.read_excel in agent instructions and XML parsing in scripts/office/unpack.py and scripts/office/validators/base.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not specify delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded in cell data.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of soffice, gcc, and git across various utility scripts.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses defusedxml for XML parsing, which provides protection against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, but does not sanitize cell content before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 25, 2026, 08:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — xlsx