after-effects
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources such as SRT subtitle files and CSV spreadsheets, as well as project-level metadata like composition and layer names. These inputs are reflected in the agent's context and could be used to influence its reasoning if they contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: Subtitle text in
srt-import.jsx, spreadsheet data incomp-from-csv.jsx, and project item names inproject-overview.jsx. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions when presenting this data to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash(osascript),Write, andReadtools. - Sanitization: No significant sanitization or validation is performed on the ingested text before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill creates and executes scripts dynamically at runtime. It specifically instructs the agent to write custom JSX code to a file (
ae-action.jsx) and then execute it via a shell command. While this is the intended design for After Effects automation, it represents a flexible execution model. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 4 and Step 6 detail the process of writing and then running action scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/runner.shscript generates JXA (JavaScript for Automation) commands by directly interpolating shell variables into strings passed toosascript. This creates a potential injection vector if the input variables, such as file paths, were to contain characters that break the JXA string context. - Evidence: The construction of
JXA_SCRIPTinrunner.shusing"$AE_APP"and"$SCRIPT_PATH"without JXA-specific escaping.
Audit Metadata