AgentDB Advanced Features

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation includes a sudo command (sudo ufw allow 4433/udp) which requires root privileges to modify system firewall rules for QUIC synchronization.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instruction to use npx agentdb@latest which downloads and executes the latest version of a package from the npm registry, representing a remote code execution risk.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external Node.js packages agentic-flow and agentdb from public registries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: The insertPattern function accepts external data such as documentText in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or ignore instructions are present in the provided examples.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs subprocess calls via CLI and network operations via the QUIC protocol.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of ingested text is performed before it is synthesized into context.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Metadata analysis reveals a potential character-substitution pattern between the author handle aegntic and the referenced toolset agentic-flow (ae vs ag), which can be a sign of deceptive naming.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 26, 2026, 08:45 PM