agentic-jujutsu
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions specify installing the
agentic-jujutsupackage from the NPM registry usingnpx agentic-jujutsu, which fetches and executes external code at runtime.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool provides anexecute()method used to run shell commands. While documentation shows standard usage likegit push, the method provides an unrestricted interface for executing arbitrary system commands.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements logic (e.g., in theSelfImprovingAgentclass) that receives a list ofrecommendedOperationsfrom an AI model and executes them sequentially. This pattern represents dynamic execution of instructions generated at runtime.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious input data can influence the commands suggested by the AI.\n - Ingestion points: User-supplied task descriptions passed to
jj.getSuggestion()andjj.startTrajectory()inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: None identified; inputs are interpolated directly into the tool's logic.\n
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell execution via
jj.execute()across all documented examples.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of task descriptions before they are used to generate suggested operations.
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