arch-epic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator script
scripts/run_arch_epic.pyusessubprocess.Popento invoke external AI agent CLI tools and manage repository-level commands. This behavior is the core functional requirement of the skill and is implemented with security-conscious shell quoting to prevent argument injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a standard indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the repository (such as code files and worklogs) via child agents. However, the system prompts for these agents utilize structured boundary markers and explicit scoping instructions to mitigate the risk of unintended instruction execution.
- Ingestion points: Repo files, epic and sub-plan documents, and worklogs are read and passed to child agent prompts.
- Boundary markers: The documentation in
references/auto-harness-prompts.mddefines structured system prompts with headers like## Missionand## Boundariesto constrain child agent behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute commands via the
claude,codex, andgrokCLIs, as documented in the workflow references. - Sanitization: The
_shell_quoteutility inscripts/run_arch_epic.pyensures all dynamically generated command arguments are properly escaped.
Audit Metadata