aeon-update
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads and executes a binary named
eyebrowfrom a third-party GitHub repository (alexverify/eyebrow). - Evidence: The script in step S7 uses
gh release downloadto fetch the binary and executes it usingenv -ito generate an integrity lock for new skills. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches framework updates and binary assets from external GitHub repositories.
- Evidence: Uses
gh apito compare and fetch content from an upstream repository (defaulting toaeonfun/aeonbut overridable via therepo=parameter) andgh release downloadfor theeyebrowtool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs shell commands to perform repository mutations and GitHub interactions.
- Evidence: Uses
git merge-filefor 3-way merges,git committo stage changes, andgh pr createto submit updates for review. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from an external upstream repository, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: File contents and commit messages are fetched from the
UPSTREAMrepository via GitHub API inSKILL.md(S4, S6). - Boundary markers: The PR body template uses Markdown headers and specific sections to isolate upstream content (S9).
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files, manage git branches, create Pull Requests, and execute binaries (S7, S9).
- Sanitization: It uses
git commit -Fto handle commit messages safely, avoiding direct shell interpolation of commit text (S9).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata