auto-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external URLs to generate automated recommendations for enabling new agent capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts a list of URLs in the
${var}input field in Mode A, which are سپس fetched via WebFetch or the GitHub API. - Boundary markers: The skill includes explicit security instructions to treat all fetched content as untrusted and to flag "SUSPECT_CONTENT" if the agent detects prompt injection markers like "ignore previous" or role-play instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute web fetches, query the GitHub API, perform git operations, and create Pull Requests to modify the
aeon.ymlconfiguration file. - Sanitization: The skill normalizes URLs and explicitly rejects dangerous protocols such as
javascript:,data:, and local file paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage version control and Pull Requests.
- Evidence: Mode B (Enable mode) executes
git checkout,git add,git commit,git push, andgh pr createto automate the enablement of skills. - Mitigation: Input slugs are strictly validated against a character-limited regex (
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$) and verified for existence in the localskills/directory before being interpolated into commands, effectively preventing command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to retrieve information from external sources.
- Evidence: In Mode A, the skill uses
WebFetchto analyze project sites, blogs, and crypto-project metadata. It also usesgh apito inspect GitHub repositories and organization data for recommendation signals.
Audit Metadata