pack-submit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill recursively copies the contents of a local skill directory using
cp -R "skills/$SLUG/." "$PACK_DIR/skills/$SLUG/"and pushes it to a public GitHub repository. This creates a significant risk of accidental exposure if the source directory contains sensitive information such as .env files, private keys, or internal configuration files that were not intended for publication. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill processes user-provided input in
${var}to extract a skill slug and flags using shell commands likeawkandcut. While the slug is validated with a regex, the remaining flags are parsed dynamically, which could lead to command injection if malicious shell metacharacters are included in the input and executed by the agent's shell environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill reads metadata and content (title, description, category, requirements, and capabilities) from local
SKILL.mdfiles located in theskills/$SLUG/directory. - Boundary markers: The skill performs basic regex validation on the slug name and runs local validation scripts (
validate-pack.sh,validate-skill-packs.mjs) before pushing data to external services. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including creating public GitHub repositories, pushing code, opening Pull Requests on the central registry, and writing to the local filesystem and memory logs.
- Sanitization: Although
jqis used for manifest creation, the skill relies onsedand Python string interpolation for README updates and Pull Request descriptions. Maliciously crafted metadata in a source skill could potentially influence the behavior of the registry or mislead users who view the generated PR and repository.
Audit Metadata