send-email
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user-supplied arguments and external context about recipients to compose email bodies.
- Ingestion points: The
${var}input and recipient-specific context from external sources. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit delimiters or markers when interpolating untrusted data into the composition prompt, though it does instruct the agent to treat fetched context as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network capabilities (via
./secretcurl) and filesystem write access (to logs and drafts). - Sanitization: A regex-based "Secret tripwire" is implemented to identify and block the transmission of sensitive tokens (e.g., AWS, GitHub, Resend) or private keys if they appear in the email body.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various local CLI tools including
python3,jq,grep, anddate, as well as a local scriptscripts/check_email_bounces.py. These executions are limited to generating JSON payloads, maintaining the email ledger, and checking delivery statuses. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with the Resend API (
api.resend.com) to send emails and poll for bounces. Resend is a well-known service, and these interactions are essential for the skill's primary function. - [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices for handling secrets, such as avoiding passing the
RESEND_API_KEYas a command-line argument by using environment variables inside Python heredocs and utilizing placeholders for shell-level secret expansion.
Audit Metadata