skill-article
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes standard command-line interface (CLI) tools to gather track-record data for the articles.
- Evidence: Uses
gh pr list --searchto find related pull requests and issues. - Evidence: Uses
git log -- skills/<name>/to determine the history and ship dates of the target skills. - Evidence: Executes a local notification script via
./notify -f /tmp/skill-article-notify.mdto alert the operator of the generated content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill optionally integrates with an external AI service for visual asset generation.
- Evidence: Calls
mcp__higgsfield__*tools (Higgsfield) to generate a 16:9 title banner based on a visual prompt derived from the skill's thesis. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads from potentially sensitive internal directories to tailor the content's voice and verify its history.
- Evidence: Accesses
memory/logs/andmemory/MEMORY.mdto extract real-world usage statistics. - Evidence: Reads
soul/SOUL.mdandsoul/STYLE.mdto adopt the intended writing style for the output. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes and summarizes external/untrusted content (other skills and logs).
- Ingestion points: Reads the body of
skills/<name>/SKILL.mdandmemory/logs/files (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Not explicitly implemented in the prompt templates; however, the skill mandates that every claim must trace to a specific line in the source file, which acts as a grounding constraint.
- Capability inventory: Capabilities include file system writes (
output/), network-based image generation (Higgsfield), and notification delivery (./notify). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the ingested skill content is mentioned before it is processed for the article.
Audit Metadata