cart
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation and execution of custom modules containing HTML, CSS, and JavaScript. These modules are "upserted" into the cart profile via the
lexsis_drafts.cart_edittool. While the skill documentation mentions compiler restrictions (e.g., blockingwindowanddocumentaccess) and scoping, the capability to inject and run authored scripts at runtime is a significant security surface. - Evidence: Documented in
SKILL.md(Workflow step 5) and detailed inreferences/module-authoring.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data including Shopify product catalogs, customer metadata, and reward configurations. This data is interpolated into custom modules and visibility rules (e.g.,
visible_whenclauses). Although the skill specifies the use of boundary markers and sanitization for CSS and script escapes, the ingestion of external data combined with the ability to write to live storefront configurations creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points:
lexsis_cart.get(fetching effective profile and history), Shopify catalog IDs, and customer metadata accessed via host session providers. - Boundary markers: Explicit instructions in
SKILL.mdto use scoped CSS and the rejection of remote URLs and script escapes. - Capability inventory:
lexsis_drafts.cart_edit(draft modification),lexsis_live_ops.cart_publish(publication of configurations), and managed cart commands (lx:cart:*) for cart mutations. - Sanitization: Compiler-enforced restrictions on global object access (
window,document) and automated sanitization and scoping of custom CSS at render time.
Audit Metadata