extract

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided keywords directly into a shell command: grep -rni "<keywords>" "$MEMORY_DIR/". This allows for command injection if the user input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons, pipes, or backticks, potentially enabling arbitrary command execution on the host.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the directory $HOME/.claude/projects/, which is a sensitive path containing the agent's interaction history and project-specific memory. Accessing this data exposes private interaction logs to the extraction process.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:\n
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads historical interaction data from the project's memory directory (MEMORY_DIR) as specified in the Step 1 workflow in SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the content is retrieved via grep and passed to the next stage without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (grep, sed), writes multiple files (SKILL.md, README.md), and spawns sub-agents (skill-extractor).\n
  • Sanitization: Absent; while the skill includes quality gates for the final output, it does not sanitize or escape the data read from the memory files before processing.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a secondary agent (skill-extractor) to dynamically generate and write executable skill files based on the contents of the potentially untrusted memory logs.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 02:33 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — extract