extract
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided keywords directly into a shell command:
grep -rni "<keywords>" "$MEMORY_DIR/". This allows for command injection if the user input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons, pipes, or backticks, potentially enabling arbitrary command execution on the host.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the directory$HOME/.claude/projects/, which is a sensitive path containing the agent's interaction history and project-specific memory. Accessing this data exposes private interaction logs to the extraction process.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:\n - Ingestion points: The skill reads historical interaction data from the project's memory directory (
MEMORY_DIR) as specified in the Step 1 workflow inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the content is retrieved via
grepand passed to the next stage without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n - Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (
grep,sed), writes multiple files (SKILL.md,README.md), and spawns sub-agents (skill-extractor).\n - Sanitization: Absent; while the skill includes quality gates for the final output, it does not sanitize or escape the data read from the memory files before processing.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a secondary agent (
skill-extractor) to dynamically generate and write executable skill files based on the contents of the potentially untrusted memory logs.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata