nlm-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
references/troubleshooting.mdfile contains instructions to bypass sandbox security restrictions. Specifically, it suggests using the--sandbox danger-full-accessflag in the OpenAI Codex environment to resolve network connectivity issues. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, potentially untrusted sources, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via URLs (web/YouTube), Google Drive documents, and local files as defined in
SKILL.mdandreferences/mcp_tools.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to delimit untrusted source content or warn the agent to ignore embedded instructions within that content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
bashfor CLI command execution and multiple MCP tools that perform file system operations, network requests, and content generation. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of external source content is implemented before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on the execution of shell commands through the
nlmCLI viabash. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, it requires high trust in thenlmbinary and the environment where it runs.
Audit Metadata