skills/afelipeg/anthropic-skills-for-enterprise-marketing-os/recommender-systems/Gen Agent Trust Hub
recommender-systems
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from CSV files, which is an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection in agentic workflows.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the reading of CSV files (e.g.,
data/ratings.csv,data/items.csv,data/transactions.csv) in files likescripts/svd_basic.pyandscripts/evaluate_top_k.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including local shell execution via
bash_tooland network access throughweb_search. - Sanitization: The scripts use standard library functions like
pandas.read_csvbut do not implement specific sanitization or filtering of the content before presenting summaries or samples to the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: No direct attempts to override system instructions, bypass safety filters, or extract system prompts were detected in the skill instructions or metadata.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: No evidence of hardcoded credentials, sensitive file access (e.g., SSH keys, AWS configs), or unauthorized network exfiltration was found. The skill uses
web_searchfor industry benchmarks, which is consistent with its stated purpose. - [OBFUSCATION]: All scripts and instructions are provided in plain text. No Base64, zero-width characters, or other encoding techniques were used to hide malicious logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts to perform mathematical modeling. These scripts use well-known libraries like
numpyandpandasand do not involve dangerous patterns such aseval()on untrusted input or arbitrary subprocess spawning.
Audit Metadata