skills/affaan-m/ecc/autonomous-loops/Gen Agent Trust Hub

autonomous-loops

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes patterns (Infinite Agentic Loop, Ralphinho DAG) that ingest untrusted external data such as specifications and RFC documents (specs/component-spec.md, RFC/PRD Document). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in these documents could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Specification files (Markdown) in SKILL.md (Infinite Agentic Loop section) and RFC/PRD documents processed by orchestrator agents in the Ralphinho section.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers are defined in the provided patterns.
  • Capability inventory: Agents are granted broad capabilities including file system access (Write, Edit), shell access (Bash), and GitHub CLI integration (gh) as seen in the command examples.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the input specifications is described.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples of automating complex workflows using shell scripts and Claude Code commands. While these are intended for legitimate automation (TDD, CI/CD integration, PR management), they involve extensive execution of system commands like claude -p, gh pr, and git worktree.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Mentions the continuous-claude tool and suggests installation from its repository. The skill correctly advises users to review the code before installation and warns against piping external scripts directly to bash, which is a security best practice.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 19, 2026, 06:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — autonomous-loops