autonomous-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes patterns (Infinite Agentic Loop, Ralphinho DAG) that ingest untrusted external data such as specifications and RFC documents (
specs/component-spec.md,RFC/PRD Document). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in these documents could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Specification files (Markdown) in
SKILL.md(Infinite Agentic Loop section) and RFC/PRD documents processed by orchestrator agents in the Ralphinho section. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers are defined in the provided patterns.
- Capability inventory: Agents are granted broad capabilities including file system access (
Write,Edit), shell access (Bash), and GitHub CLI integration (gh) as seen in the command examples. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the input specifications is described.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples of automating complex workflows using shell scripts and Claude Code commands. While these are intended for legitimate automation (TDD, CI/CD integration, PR management), they involve extensive execution of system commands like
claude -p,gh pr, andgit worktree. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Mentions the
continuous-claudetool and suggests installation from its repository. The skill correctly advises users to review the code before installation and warns against piping external scripts directly to bash, which is a security best practice.
Audit Metadata