ck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features an indirect prompt injection surface in
hooks/session-start.mjsandcommands/init.mjs. These scripts automatically parse files in the current working directory—such asCLAUDE.md,package.json, andREADME.md—to extract goals and project descriptions. This data is then injected into the agent's system prompt at the start of every session without sufficient sanitization or boundary markers, allowing a malicious repository to potentially steer the agent's instructions. - Ingestion points: The skill reads
CLAUDE.md,package.json,go.mod,Cargo.toml,pyproject.toml, andREADME.mdfrom the project's root directory. - Boundary markers: The extracted content is interpolated into the session context without protective delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes local Node.js scripts, performs filesystem writes to the user's home directory (under
~/.claude/ck/), and executes systemgitcommands. - Sanitization: The extracted text is only subjected to basic whitespace trimming before being included in the agent's context.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
hooks/session-start.mjshook utilizes an explicit "IMPORTANT: Display ... verbatim" instruction. This is a direct instruction injection intended to force the agent to display the project context block as its first response, overriding the model's standard greeting behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on
child_process.spawnSyncwithincommands/shared.mjsandhooks/session-start.mjsto invoke thegitbinary. This is used to gather commit history and activity summaries (e.g.,git log,git diff). While this is part of the skill's intended functionality for tracking project progress, it involves executing external CLI tools with arguments derived from the local environment.
Audit Metadata