ito-compute
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to install a CLI tool by cloning a repository from an unverified source (github.com/Ito-Markets/ito-cloud-runtime.git) and running
npm ci. This process involves executing code from a repository that is not recognized as a trusted vendor. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external GPU inventory queries and RFQ status updates through its tool interfaces, which could be exploited to inject instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the output of the
ecc ito findandecc ito statuscommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to distinguish between its own system instructions and the data returned from external commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the execution of multiple subprocesses using the
itoCLI, includingfind,accept, andevalscommands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the output received from the external API tools.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute JavaScript files (
ito.js,ito-mcp.js) at runtime based on paths provided through environment variables likeECC_ITO_CLI_EXECUTABLE. This allows for the dynamic loading and execution of code from potentially arbitrary locations on the file system.
Audit Metadata