lead-intelligence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of ingesting and processing untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested in
enrichment-agent.mdandsignal-scorer.mdfrom external sources including Exa web search results, X (Twitter) posts, and GitHub profiles. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not implement delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to separate external data from the agent's system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The agents possess high-privilege capabilities including the
Bashtool and network access viaWebFetch. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation steps are defined for the data retrieved from social media or web searches.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
enrichment-agent,mutual-mapper, andsignal-scoreragents are configured with theBashtool. The skill further indicates the use of desktop automation to interact with Apple Mail (Mail.app) for creating drafts, which typically relies on shell-based execution paths. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to and downloads data from several external services including the X API, Exa Search API, and various public web domains for lead enrichment and signal scoring.
Audit Metadata