plan-canvas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a feedback loop where the agent ingests and acts upon JSON-formatted human feedback (free-form chat and element-specific annotations) returned by the
ecc-plan-canvas awaitcommand. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface as the agent is instructed to respond to and potentially execute instructions contained within this untrusted input. - Ingestion points: The stdout of the
ecc-plan-canvas awaitCLI command. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore embedded instructions in the feedback JSON.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
ecc-plan-canvas), edit local files (artifact revisions), and perform network operations via the background server. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of filtering or escaping the text fields within the
kind: "chat"orkind: "annotation"feedback items. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of several CLI commands (
ecc-plan-canvas open,await,pending,typing,end) and suggests running Node.js scripts directly (node "$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/scripts/plan-canvas.js"). These tools manage a background server and process local file paths. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The browser-based canvas component fetches the Mermaid diagram rendering library from a remote CDN at runtime (configurable via
ECC_PLAN_CANVAS_MERMAID_URL). While this is a common practice for rendering visual content, it involves loading third-party code into the user's browser environment.
Audit Metadata