plankton-code-quality
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
PostToolUsehooks to automatically trigger a suite of external formatting and linting tools includingruff,biome,shfmt,taplo,hadolint, andshellcheckupon every file edit. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements
PreToolUsehooks to intercept and block standard system commands (e.g.,pip,npm,yarn,pnpm), essentially overriding the user's expected environment behavior. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and executes subprocesses using the
claude -pcommand to automate code repairs. This execution is gated by internal logic that selects different model tiers (Haiku, Sonnet, Opus) and time-outs based on the content of the file edits. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a feedback loop that is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted code from file modifications, extracts violations, and passes that data to automated LLM subprocesses. An attacker could craft code that, when processed by the linters, triggers specific malicious behaviors in the fix-delegation phase.
- Ingestion points: Hook runs on every file edit; content is parsed by
multi_linter.sh. - Boundary markers: None specified for the violation JSON passed to subprocesses.
- Capability inventory: Full file-system write access (via
claude -psubprocesses) and shell command execution. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for linter error messages before they are used as prompts for the delegated models.
Audit Metadata