plankton-code-quality
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill describes a three-phase architecture that spawns
claude -psubprocesses to handle complex code fixes. This design delegates execution to a new agent instance using runtime-generated JSON data, creating a dynamic execution flow controlled by the workspace state.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a vulnerability surface where malicious code in workspace files can influence the behavior of remediation subprocesses. \n - Ingestion points: Workspace files are processed by linters in the
multi_linter.shhook, generating violation summaries. \n - Boundary markers: There are no described delimiters or instructions to ensure the subprocess ignores instructions embedded within the violation data. \n
- Capability inventory: The secondary
claude -pinstance has the capability to write and modify code in the repository. \n - Sanitization: The skill does not document any sanitization or validation logic for the linter output before it is interpolated into the subprocess prompt.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs
PreToolUsehooks to intercept and block specific shell commands. It restricts legacy package managers such aspip,npm, andpoetryto enforce the use of modern tools likeuvorbun.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The setup process involves installing several third-party utilities and linters from public registries, includingjaq,ruff,uv, andbiome. These are well-known developer tools used for static analysis and formatting.
Audit Metadata