rules-distill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes content from other (potentially untrusted) skills to generate rule suggestions.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/scan-skills.shscript readsSKILL.mdfiles from both global (~/.claude/skills) and project-level directories. - Boundary markers: While the subagent prompt in
SKILL.mduses headers to separate inputs, it does not include explicit warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested text. - Capability inventory: The skill is designed to modify rule files in
~/.claude/rules/(appending, revising, or creating new files), providing a clear path for an injection to affect system behavior. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the content of the skills before they are processed by the LLM subagent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local bash scripts to perform inventory and scanning tasks.
- Evidence: The skill calls
scripts/scan-skills.shandscripts/scan-rules.shto read directory structures and file contents. - Context: These scripts use environment variables (e.g.,
RULES_DISTILL_DIR) to override default paths, which is intended for testing but allows the tool to be pointed at any directory for scanning.
Audit Metadata