videodb
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external URLs or local files and processes it through AI models to generate transcripts and scene descriptions. This content is then used to influence agent behavior or generate summaries.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted media enters the system via
coll.upload(url=...)andcoll.upload(file_path=...)as documented inSKILL.mdandreference/api-reference.md. - Boundary markers: There are no specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions provided when passing generated transcripts or scene descriptions to the agent or into
coll.generate_text(). - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
videodbSDK to perform network operations (API calls to*.videodb.io) and theBashtool to run Python scripts that write event logs to~/.local/state/videodb/viascripts/ws_listener.py. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement explicit sanitization of transcripts or AI-generated visual descriptions before processing them with further LLM calls.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands to install dependencies and run local scripts for session management.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides instructions forpip installand running thescripts/ws_listener.pybackground process to capture real-time events. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on the agent generating and executing Python snippets at runtime to interact with the VideoDB SDK.
- Evidence: Multiple examples in
SKILL.mdand reference documents show the use ofpython -cand heredocs (python << 'EOF') to initialize connections and perform video operations.
Audit Metadata