visa-doc-translate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install several Python packages to enable its functionality.
  • Evidence: pip install pillow reportlab, pip install pyobjc-framework-Vision pyobjc-framework-Quartz, pip install easyocr, and pip install pytesseract.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses system command-line utilities and package managers to perform its tasks without requesting user confirmation.
  • Evidence: Uses sips for image conversion (sips -s format png <input> --out <output>), brew for Tesseract installation, and pip for Python package management.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and executes a Python script at runtime to produce the final PDF document.
  • Evidence: Instruction in SKILL.md to "Create a Python script using PIL and reportlab libraries" and "Execute the script to generate the PDF".
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted text from user-provided images via OCR.
  • Ingestion points: Image file paths provided by the user (SKILL.md steps 1-3).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are used to separate OCR-extracted content from the agent's internal logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution (sips, pip, brew) and the ability to generate and execute Python code.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the text extracted from documents before it is passed to the translation or PDF generation steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 12, 2026, 10:24 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — visa-doc-translate