create-agent-harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill migrates content from legacy configuration files (e.g.,
.cursorrules,AGENTS.md) and repository documentation into the primary harness files (CLAUDE.md,.claude/rules/). If an attacker embeds malicious instructions in these legacy files, they could be promoted to always-on instructions for the agent. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdPhase 1 (Discovery) and Phase 2 (Migration) read content from various legacy files and existing codebase documentation. - Boundary markers: The skill does not generate explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat migrated content as untrusted by the model.
- Capability inventory: The generated agents have broad capabilities including
Bashexecution,Edit, andWritetools. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or validation of the text being migrated from legacy files into the new harness structure.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and registers shell scripts as
PostToolUsehooks in.claude/settings.json, leading to automatic code execution upon tool events. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdsection 3.15 describes generating scripts likeformat-on-edit.shand wiring them to execute automatically afterEditorWriteoperations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a wide range of shell commands for repository discovery, git management, and validation.
- Evidence: Multiple phases in
SKILL.mdutilizegit,find,grep,ls, andmkdir. Thescripts/validate-harness.shscript also usesawkandgrepto process file contents.
Audit Metadata