imagegen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include shell command templates that interpolate the user's prompt directly into a JSON payload for a
curlrequest (e.g.,-d "{\"prompt\":\"<PROMPT>\",...}"). This pattern creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection or command injection if the agent fails to properly escape the input before execution. - Ingestion points: User prompts in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent in the shell command templates.
- Capability inventory:
curl,python3(used for subprocess execution and data parsing). - Sanitization: No explicit instructions for escaping or validating the user-provided prompt content are included in the skill body.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python and shell scripts to read configuration data from
~/.config/imagegen/auth.json, manage temporary files intmp/imagegen/, and execute network requests viacurl. While these operations support the skill's primary function, the dynamic assembly of shell commands increases the security surface. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
install.shandbin/create-image-codex.jsscripts download and update the skill's source code from its GitHub repository (https://github.com/afu-it/create-image-codex.git). Additionally,SETUP.mdrecommends installing standard Python packages (openai,pillow) from official package registries.
Audit Metadata