codebase-index
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to access and 'inspect' sensitive configuration files, specifically environment files (e.g., .env, .env.local, .env.production).
- Evidence:
rules/exploration-depth.mdmandates theinspectdepth for 'Configuration files', stating they 'control behavior' and 'missing one means missing understanding'. - Evidence:
references/codebase-archetypes.mdinstructs the agent to 'Look for' environment variables and .env files across multiple project archetypes (Next.js, Django, FastAPI, Docker). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it requires the agent to read and process the full content of all files in an untrusted codebase without safety boundaries.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read every file in the project directory using
read,glob, andgreptools as specified inSKILL.mdandrules/exploration-depth.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or to disregard natural language instructions found within the source code or documentation files (e.g., README.md, business logic files).
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Read,Glob,Grep, andTask(parallel sub-agents) tools as listed in theinstruction_contractinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not provide mechanisms to filter or escape content read from the files before the agent 'synthesizes' it into an artifact.
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