ag2-use-builtin-tools
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of data from untrusted external sources like web search results and MCP servers into the agent context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where external content could attempt to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
WebSearchTool,WebFetchTool, andMCPServerTooldocumented inSKILL.mdingest external web and API content. - Boundary markers: The provided code recipes do not demonstrate explicit prompt delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables powerful capabilities including
CodeExecutionToolandFilesystemToolkit(which are mitigated by recommended sandboxing). - Sanitization: Explicit data sanitization is not covered in the implementation recipes.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions for installing well-known Python packages (such as
exa-py) and framework-specific extras (ag2[ddgs],ag2[tavily]). These are standard dependencies for the search functionalities described. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the integration of the
CodeExecutionToolandSkillsToolkit, which allow the agent to run code or scripts. The documentation forFilesystemToolkitincludes security-positive instructions for usingbase_pathsandboxing andread_onlymodes to prevent unauthorized file access or path traversal attacks.
Audit Metadata