job-search-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages system-level persistence by configuring automated tasks using cron and launchd. It instructs the agent to compose and register run recipes that execute periodically without an active user session to ensure search reliability.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The system is subject to indirect prompt injection risks because it ingests and analyzes job postings from third-party websites (LinkedIn, Ashby, Greenhouse, Lever). A malicious job description could contain hidden instructions designed to manipulate the evaluation logic or influence the agent's actions.
  • Ingestion points: Job postings fetched from external sources via the agent-data CLI.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are defined for the evaluation of external content.
  • Capability inventory: Local file system writes to ~/.job-search/, system scheduler modifications, and network requests via vendor-provided tools.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or filtering of the external job description text before it is analyzed by a subagent.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from LinkedIn, Ashby, Greenhouse, and Lever, and communicates with the vendor's service at agent-data.motie.dev. While these are vendor-managed resources, they involve external data flows and API quota management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 12:04 PM