mergepatrol
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, which creates a risk of indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent is directed to read PR comments, unresolved review threads, and findings from Mergepatrol's automated review as specified in the 'What counts as a comment' and 'The loop' sections of
SKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute GitHub CLI commands (
gh pr edit,gh stack), interact with Mergepatrol MCP tools to modify PR states, and is expected to push commits to fix review findings. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat comment content as untrusted data, increasing the risk that instructions embedded in comments could influence agent behavior.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the content of the comments before the agent acts upon them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (
gh) and a suite of MCP tools (queue_pull,dequeue_pull,pull_status,list_queue) to manage pull request states and labels. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of PR management.
Audit Metadata