self-host-agenta
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The troubleshooting documentation recommends using high-privilege commands such as
sudoand modifying the host'sdockergroup (sudo usermod -aG docker $USER) to resolve permission issues, which grants root-equivalent access to the host. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to send setup feedback to a public
ntfy.shtopic (https://ntfy.sh/agenta-bdk-feedback-install). Because this topic is unauthenticated and publicly readable, there is a risk of exfiltrating sensitive operational details if they are not correctly redacted by the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of external command outputs. Ingestion points: Data enters the context via Docker Compose logs and
curlcommand responses. Boundary markers: The skill relies on instructional warnings within the markdown files to prompt the agent to redact secrets. Capability inventory: The agent is grantedBash,Read,Edit,Write,Grep, andGlobcapabilities. Sanitization: No automated sanitization or schema validation is implemented for external data ingestion; redaction is manual.
Audit Metadata