doctor-strange
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external web sources to ground its simulations in real-world intelligence, which creates an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill utilizes multiple parallel searches via
WebSearchandWebFetchin Step 2.5 and Step 3 to gather data from external websites, articles, and reports. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompts lack explicit delimiters or specific instructions to the models to disregard instructions potentially hidden in the fetched external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Agenttool calls to spawn parallel sub-processes and performs local file writes to create simulation dossiers and update the project'sMEMORY.mdindex. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external URLs is mentioned before the data is incorporated into the intelligence briefing and processed by the subagents.
Audit Metadata