aporia-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from Aporia tickets, including markdown descriptions, comment threads, and file attachments (HTML, Markdown). This content is used to plan and execute code changes, presenting a risk that malicious instructions embedded in a ticket could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
aporia:pull_item(item body, rationale, and comments) andaporia:read_attachment(text-based files) as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdlack specific requirements for using delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" headers when handling external ticket content. - Capability inventory: As described in
SKILL.md(Phases 3 and 4), the agent has the authority to perform repository modifications (git branching, file editing), execute shell commands for testing, and modify external records viaaporia:update_itemandaporia:resolve_items. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the ingested content is performed before it is used for planning or code implementation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.mdinvolves executing local shell commands for git operations (Phase 3) and for implementing and testing code changes (Phase 4). While these are standard development tasks, they represent a capability that could be misused if the agent's instructions are overridden via indirect injection.
Audit Metadata