agentmail

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During installation, the npm/scripts/postinstall.js script fetches a platform-specific binary from the official vendor repository on GitHub (github.com/agentmail-to/agentmail-cli). This is a documented and standard distribution mechanism for this service.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The package invokes system utilities including tar, unzip, or powershell to extract downloaded assets. The CLI also executes the system pager (e.g., less) when handling large data streams for user display.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: (Category 8: Indirect Prompt Injection surface) The skill's architecture presents a vulnerability surface where external data could influence sensitive operations.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to provide string values for email parameters such as --subject, --text, and --html using data often sourced from untrusted external contexts (e.g., incoming email summaries or user-provided messages).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or specific 'ignore instructions' warnings for external data interpolation.
  • Capability inventory: The CLI implementation in pkg/cmd/flagoptions.go includes a feature that automatically reads and embeds the contents of local files when a parameter is prefixed with @, @file://, or @data://. When combined with the tool's ability to send network requests to the AgentMail API, this creates a read-and-exfiltrate capability.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The CLI logic does not appear to strip or validate the @ prefix from input strings before processing them as potential file system paths.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 26, 2026, 03:08 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agentmail