astrobrowse-authenticated-agentic-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the open web, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a website could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent receives external data through
extract_page(which returns visible text or HTML),list_accounts(listing saved login identifiers), andlist_downloads(returning filenames from the browser). - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or explicit boundary instructions to prevent the agent from following natural language commands found within extracted page content.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent high-level capabilities, including browser automation (
run_steps), file uploads (upload_file), and file downloads (download_file). - Sanitization: Although
extract_pageandstatusare described as returning "sanitized" or "capped" content, there is no detailed mechanism provided to sanitize against adversarial instructions embedded in web content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
run_stepsaction allows the agent to execute a sequence of browser automation commands (e.g.,goto,click,fill,type_text) using the user's authenticated sessions. While the grammar is restricted and JavaScript injection is explicitly blocked, these commands enable the agent to interact with and modify state in sensitive external web applications such as CRMs, ERPs, and social media platforms.
Audit Metadata