scientific-thinking
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Update check' section in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to execute a series of shell commands to manage its own lifecycle. These include usinggit ls-remote,awk,sed,sort, andtailto determine the latest available version, andgit pullto update the skill directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's update mechanism involves network operations to fetch tag information and code updates from a remote git repository (upstream origin).
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions for the agent to run
git pull --ff-onlyconstitute a remote code execution vector. If the upstream repository is compromised, the agent would pull and potentially execute malicious logic during the update process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to analyze untrusted external data, such as research findings and paper conclusions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill is explicitly intended to process 'experimental results', 'paper conclusions', and 'scientific evidence' provided by the user or retrieved from external sources (defined in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: While the reasoning framework emphasizes separating 'observed fact' from 'interpretation', it does not define strict technical boundaries or delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the analyzed scientific text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities (via
gitand associated utilities) as outlined in the update instructions. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the content of the research data before processing.
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