skills/agentscope-ai/qwenpaw/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Library injection and runtime compilation. The script 'scripts/office/soffice.py' writes a C source string to a temporary location and compiles it into a shared library using 'gcc'. It then utilizes the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject this library into the 'soffice' process to shim system calls.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Macro generation. 'scripts/recalc.py' generates a LibreOffice StarBasic macro and writes it to the local environment to enable automated calculation and saving of workbooks.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: Configuration modification. 'scripts/recalc.py' writes a macro file to the user's LibreOffice configuration directory (e.g., ~/.config/libreoffice/ or AppData/Roaming/LibreOffice/), which remains present across application sessions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: System utility invocation. The skill uses 'subprocess.run' to execute 'soffice', 'gcc', 'git', and 'timeout' across various scripts to process documents and manage environment shims.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerability surface via data ingestion. (1) Ingestion points: The skill reads and unpacks Office XML content from potentially untrusted files in 'scripts/office/unpack.py' and 'scripts/recalc.py'. (2) Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters to isolate data from commands. (3) Capability inventory: The skill has broad execution capabilities including subprocess calls to compilers and office suites. (4) Sanitization: The skill uses 'defusedxml' and 'lxml' for XML parsing, providing protection against typical XML exploits like Billion Laughs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 04:58 AM